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Abstract.  This article gives an overview of the local reforms 
undertaken between 1998 and 2011 in seven CEE countries (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
The interest lies especially in determining national actions for increasing 
transparency of local self-government and decentralisation. Reading the 
European monitoring documents prior and after accession (where 
available), and national strategies of reform, the author argues that for 
the CEE region reforms undertaken during accession to the European 
Union had not been entirely internalized, and that in the absence of any 
conditionality costs, these countries experienced a reform regress. As 
results are presented, the prediction proves invalid for some part of the 
region and the authors advocate for the need of cross-referencing data 
and advance research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Europeanisation became an interesting tool of analysis for Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) states once they embarked on the road to 
democratization and the European Union (EU). Defined by Ladrech (1994,   
p. 69) as an incremental process, aimed at integrating the economic and 
political dynamics of EU in the national policy-making, Europeanisation was 
also articulated as an export process in which EU was the producer (of 
governance recipes), while the states outside its borders, the consumers (Olsen, 
2002). For the purpose of this article, Europeanisation would imply an 
incremental process of export and import of European policies and politics 
between EU and candidate transition democracies.  
Although it may sound quite straightforward, this process has known 
quite different methodological approaches. For instance, March and Olsen 
(1998) identified two ways of dealing with the problem of an international 
order (thus also of the newly European one) built on the basis of 
Europeanisation. The first was the logic of anticipated consequences or that of 
external, exogenous stimuli. The second was called the logic of appropiateness, 
or of cultural assimilation. While in the first logic, the European rules and 
policies are supposed to be transferred towards national domains by means of 
rewards and punishments, in the second one, the transfer is made possible by 
accumulating new identities in a given institutional framework, through 
collective socialization and learning. These descriptions are referential for what 
Borzel and Risse (2000) and Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2002) 
acknowledged as the (classical) rationalist and sociological institutionalism. 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2002, 2004), Kelley (2004) and 
Schimmelfenning (2005) identify an additional alternative (without explicitly 
presenting it), a hybrid which challenges the universality expectations of the 
classical approaches and complements the trials of explaining Europeanisation. 
In the following, we will focus on this last perspective, considering that the 
causal factors refer to actors’ reactivity to costs, and their capacity to 
internalize the European “ways”. We argue that for the CEE, the reforms 
targeted on increasing transparency and decentralisation of local policy-making 
had not been entirely internalized, and that in the absence of any conditionality 
costs, these countries experienced a reform regress, therefore a democratic 
regress or a process of de-Europenisation. 
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2. Conditionality and regress hypothesis 
 
Political conditionality has been widely discussed by scholars of 
international relations and European integration
(1). In general, it is assimilated 
to a system of positive and/or negative stimuli used for different international 
actors so as to generate certain behaviour (Kelley, 2004, p. 428), while stricto 
sensu, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2003, p. 495) defined it as “the 
central strategy of EU to induce non-member state harmonization with its own 
standards […]”. For Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), Europeanisation 
entailed two forms. The first one was based on democratic conditionality, 
focused on EU’s fundamental political principles, human rights rules and 
liberal democracy (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 669); compliance 
with these criteria would have started the accession negotiations
(2). The second 
one referred to conditionality by acquis, aimed at obtaining the Member status. 
In that particular situation, EU membership would have been granted in 
exchange for importing the specific rules of the European legislation 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 669). This latter approach to 
Europeanisation is the one of interest for our argument. The conditionality by 
acquis argues that accession countries see EU membership as an important 
objective of their foreign policy and as such, importing the acquis becomes a 
reasonable step towards that. Theoretical predictions on the effectiveness of the 
conditionality strategy rely on several assumptions regarding the actors 
involved in the process, mainly built on the rationalist institutionalism 
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004, Schimmelfennig, 2005). In 2004 Kelley 
offered a clear form of that idea when classifying conditionality “as a 
traditional mechanism of rational choice (…) which defined actors making 
cost-benefit analyses and considering the utility maximizers” (Kelley, 2004,  
pp. 425-428).  
Starting with these assumptions, the theoretical prediction here is that 
accession states would successfully import the (formal) European acquis. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) tested such a prediction and concluded 
that that type of conditionality was responsible for the massive import of 
legislation from EU 15 to CEE. If the membership award made the CEE 
countries to import the European institutional structure, there is one question 
that lingers: what about CEE after accession? Similar assumptions that led to 
the prediction of conditionality effectiveness generate the expectation that in 
the absence of such conditionality, CEE would regress after accession. Such a 
regress hypothesis, be it explicitly or implicitly, was formulated by Diana Iancu 
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Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004), Schimmelfenning (2005, 2008), 
Sedelmeier (2006, 2008), Epstein and Sedelmeier (2008), Meyer-Sahling 
(2009), (2011), Pridham (2008), Ungureanu and Iancu (2010), Cirtautas and 
Schimmelfenning (2010).  
Unlike the conditionality theory which received a considerable attention 
in the literature, testing the regress hypothesis is still a young attempt. There 
are some inherent difficulties. Firstly, there is not enough time between the two 
moments relevant for our analysis: the CEE countries joined EU nine 
(respectively six) years ago and any eventual regress might be a contextual, 
short-term effect which could not infer a tendency. Secondly, the hypothesis 
cover the whole area of the European acquis, which generates an immense 
research effort on several levels. As such, authors usually chose to test such an 
hypothesis locally, on specific policies and countries. This article follows this 
trend and gives an overview of the local policy reforms in seven CEE countries 
based on the reading of their official strategic documents and EU monitoring 
between 1998 and 2011
(3).  
 
3. Testing the regress hypothesis on the CEE region 
  
The seven countries chosen for this testing of the regress hypothesis come 
from the CEE region and exhibit quite different tempos and backgrounds of 
reforms. If to discuss the interest in joining the European Union, then one 
might distinguish between Poland and Hungary, the very first countries in the 
region that signed the Association Agreements in 1991, the second wave 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia), which did that similar step 
in 1993, and Slovenia, which started rather late, in 1996. If to consider the 
moment of formally requesting the membership, then Hungary and Poland 
would be again the frontrunners (1994), but Slovenia would probably compete 
for the most pragmatic behaviour, as it applied to become a candidate in the 
same time with signing the Association Agreement (1996). The starting of 
negotiation would also cut the region into two: Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia 
started in 2000, while the rest had already experiencing full download of 
European policies and politics since 1998. Different gears in reforms were 
visible even in the accession year: while most of the region joined EU in 2004, 
Bulgaria and Romania became full Member States in 2007.  
 Differences also existe in the ways the CEE countries addressed 
reforms. In this regard, the studies of Iancu (2010), Junjan and Iancu (2011) 
and Iancu (2013) become of interest, as they point that even though Local reforms by political conditionality: trials and erros in Central and Eastern Europe 
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democratisation and administrative consolidation were the main struggles the 
region had to fight, and the weapons were quite similar, the results were hardly 
comparable. Reorganising these former researches and focusing them solely on 
decentralisation and transparency, I explore here the most visible documents of 
the CEE-EU written dialogue and discuss whether there was a strategic interest 
in local policy-making. The limits of our inquiry are quite obvious, however 
my preliminary findings may prove valuable for future research of political 
conditionality in the area.  
 
3.1. Local reforms in Bulgaria  
 
Local self-government and decentralization  were not exactly the 
principles that draw the explicit attention of EU in the accession trials of 
Bulgaria. In fact, none of the Regular or Monitoring reports issued between 
1998 and 2011 dedicated more than one phrase (at most) about the progress in 
fiscal decentralization or efficient allocation of competencies between different 
levels of government. That did not mean, however, that there was no European 
interest given to the matter. In fact, by autumn 2006, considering the former 
pieces of advice regarding the need to strengthen local reforms
(4), Bulgaria 
reaffirmed its interest in pursuing the decentralization process and elaborated 
the Strategy for Decentralization (2006-2015) and the Action Plan for its 
implementation (2006-2009). It also included its formal commitment to 
strengthening good governance in the Strategic Reference Framework (2007). 
Taking into account the warding of the CVM reports of July 2008 (p. 2) and 
March 2010 (p. 3), Bulgarian institutions seemed to have managed to keep up 
the rhythm of reform envisaged by the European Union.  
As for the principles of openness and transparency in local policy-
making, only indirect references were even being made. However, be it for 
minimizing corruption, engaging in transparent privatization, or enjoying more 
open judicial trials, European reports did advocated in favor of reforming the 
Bulgarian government as a whole. Positive responses were received: in 2001 
Bulgaria adopted a Law on Access to Public Information (to be implemented 
also at local level), started the implementation of “one-stop-shops” and granted 
access to the public to policymaking processes, by publishing draft laws on the 
Internet (RR 2001, p. 16). Since, progress in these areas was annually 
reported
(5), even after EU accession
(6). This does generate a paradox: as the 
very problems that led Bulgaria into being monitored after accession were 
those closely related to corruption (and additionally, organized crime and weak Diana Iancu 
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judicial system). In 2008, the CVM Report of July even urged Bulgaria “to 
translate words into deeds and deliver on its commitment to serious reform” 
(pp. 3-6). One year later, the country seemed to have understood the substantial 
need to change and started to address the European issues up to the point when 
the European Commission accepted the new wave of reforms (CVM March 
2010, p. 3).  
 
3.2. Local reforms in Czech Republic  
 
The European reports documenting the progress towards accession were 
quite elaborated as they grounded the information on both national and external 
monitoring. That may explain why in the case of the Czech Republic, local 
self-government and decentralization did emerge as a topic of dialogue as early 
as 1998. The European Commission appraised then the regional reform 
attempts, and suggested that the country should have ratified the Council’s of 
Europe Charter on Local Self-Government (p. 8). An interesting reference 
point, giving that the literature on local policy-making usually refers to that 
Charter as to a genuine piece of the European acquis (xxx). Between 2000 and 
2003, the Regular Reports followed quite closely the decentralization/regional 
reforms the country undertook
(7), and concluded that reform was going to the 
right direction. By 2007, the National Strategic Reference Framework kept the 
same tone when discussing the efforts taken in strengthening the territorial self-
government and bringing public services closer to citizens; in fact, it concluded 
that there were no (further) reasons for concern, and that no significant changes 
were planned in the institutional area (p. 22).  
A quite different approach was given to the openness and transparency 
issue: between 1998 and 2003, there were only three very succinct/moments 
when the European Commission seemed to have been interested in it. For 
example, in 1999, after a slow start and political disinterest
(8), the Regular 
Report noted that a law on free access to public information was adopted   
(pp. 15-34); and by 2001 it expressed the European concern in the little amount 
of transparency and anti-corruption means to ensure a transparent business 
environment (Regular Report 2001, p. 15). It was, in fact, the national voice 
that addressed the issue of reform: in 2007, the Strategic Reference Framework 
called for a sustainable administrative capacity of the subnational levels of 
government (p. 23), giving that “the weaknesses in the public administration 
endangers the fulfillment of the objectives of the cohesion policies” (p. 34). By 
2010, increasing transparency and reducing corruption became national Local reforms by political conditionality: trials and erros in Central and Eastern Europe 
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priorities, and several actions were enumerated as necessary: introduction of 
Regulation Impact Assessments and Corruption Impact Assessments; 
submission a comprehensive legal amendment of lobbying; and introduction of 
the institution of  "reliability tests" for persons operating in public bodies.  
 
3.3. Local reforms in Hungary 
 
European rhetoric on decentralization in the Hungarian case was quite 
different from other CEE countries. More specifically, Hungary presented too 
much decentralization, which led to “the inefficient provision of services, and 
strains on local finances” (Regular Report 2000, p. 27). Accordingly, the 
government was called to proportionally allocate resources until the official 
accession to the European Union
(9). Several documents were elaborated to 
tackle this problem: National Spatial Development Concept (2005), the 
National and Regional Development Policy Concept (2005-2020), and the New 
Rural Development Strategic Plan (2007-2013), they all acknowledged the 
need for consolidating principles like subsidiarity, decentralization, openness, 
partnership and transparency. By 2007, not many had been changed: the 
National Strategic Reference Framework still accused the excessive 
decentralization and wanton centralization (pp. 48-49) and advised for 
continuing the reform under the framework of the State Reform and the 
Electronic Public Administration Operational Program (pp. 5, 8-9). 
Hungary offers again an interesting case in transparency building. 
Starting with appraisals at the beginning of the accession trials (between 1998 
and 1999)
(10), by 2000 Hungarian policy-making processes catch the eye of the 
European monitoring and are persuaded into addressing more seriously the 
fight against corruption (Regular Report 2000, p. 28). Such demands continued 
to be raised up to the moment of accession
(11), and, apparently, with success
(12).   
 
3.4. Local reforms in Poland 
  
Local reforms in Poland were closely watched by the European monitors 
between 1998 and 2003. Starting with appraisals for adopting a new structure 
for the administrative system, the Regular Reports also advised for an adequate 
allocation of financial revenues and an imperative need for consolidating local 
policy-making
(13). To some degree, the extensive concern for local self-
government, that lasted as long as Poland’s road to the European Union, Diana Iancu 
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generated a sort of burnout of the topic; as a consequence, soon after accession, 
no additional references were being made on the subject.  
Poland also received positive remarks on its openness and transparency 
related reforms. Between 1998 and 2003, the country enacted a new law on 
civil service that was highly appreciated both at national and European level
(14), 
a Program for Fighting against Corruption – Anticorruption Strategy (in 2002) 
and a Plan for Combating Corruption 2005-2009
(15) and created a Central 
Office against Corruption. Special attention was being paid to the meritocratic 
recruitment of local government employees, which, as expected, was reported 
to have been a success.  
 
3.5. Local reforms in Romania 
 
Decentralization and local self-government were two issues highly 
present in the European regular reports on Romania. Starting with 1999, the 
European Commission expressed its concern on the sound fiscal decentra-
lization attempts and the successful proportional allocation of competencies 
between different levels of government
(16). By 2004, despite the considerable 
efforts of the Romanian authorities in developing a strategy for managing the 
decentralization process, the transfer of responsibilities from central to local 
authorities was still not matched with an adequate transfer of resources, and not 
enough transparency was ensured (Regular Report 2004, p. 18). After three 
years of sustained trials for improving the insufficient local financial autonomy 
of governments and consolidate decentralization and regional development, in 
2007, the National Reform Plan put administrative capacity and its 
improvement on top of the national priorities list (pp. 5, 24 et seq.). In the same 
year, the National Strategic Reference Framework concluded that due to a 
political oriented management of public institutions, much yet remained to be 
done (p. 64). By 2009, several strategies on decentralization in areas like sports 
and youth, health, education, and police were adopted
(17), yet no specific 
reference to their success was comprised by the following CVM reports.  
As for the openness and transparency measures, Romania engaged on the 
road to EU accession with a red flag. Secrecy of public information, closed 
policy-making processes and deterioration of equitable application of law were 
unacceptable for the European monitors
(18). Progress was achieved with the 
enactment of the law on free access to public information (2001) and 
transparent policy-making (2003), yet the European Commission remained 
interested in monitoring their implementation
(19). By 2007, the poor Local reforms by political conditionality: trials and erros in Central and Eastern Europe 
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performance in reforming the judicial system and fighting against corruption 
made the safeguard clause to become a subject of concern for Romania. 
Unfortunately, by 2011 no significant changes were being made: “The review 
of the strategy on anti-corruption identified a lack of national and unitary 
approach in preventing and fighting corruption” (p. 7), so Romanian is still 
perceived as a slow reformer in CEE group of countries. 
 
3.6. Local reforms in Slovakia 
 
Similar to the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia also received 
European compliments for signing and ratifying the Charter of Local Self-
Government
(20). By 2001, the European Union favorably noted the enactment 
of a new law on local administrative authority, the administrative 
reorganization and the new conditions set forward for the fiscal decentralization 
(Regular Report 2001, pp. 15-16, 24). The National Strategic Reference 
Framework (2007, pp. 10-11; pp. 58-62) additionally argued that significant 
changes were carried out in the structure and organization of local government 
after 2004. Mainly, in close connection to the decentralization trials, more than 
400 competences were transferred from state administration to municipalities 
and higher territorial units with the aims of increasing the efficiency and quality 
of public administration managed. Speaking of errors, however, the public 
administration system had yet insufficient tools for assessing the quality of 
public services, especially at local level.  
Quite similar to the average reform rhythm in the CEE region, Slovakia 
also experienced a slow beginning in making its local policies more 
transparent. In the early years of accession (1998-1999), it dealt with low 
efficient fight against corruption and lack of fairness in privatization 
processes
(21). By 2003, after the enactment of the law on free access to public 
information (in 2000), progress on openness and transparency seemed evident 
(Regular Report 2002, p. 22, p. 25). However, efforts in consolidating the pace 
of reform were required (Monitoring Report 2003, p. 12). And until last year no 
substantial measures were being noticed in that regard; in January 2011, a new 
Government measure was put in place, in the form of a Central Register of 
Contracts. It represented a public list of contracts by the Government Office, 
ministries, central government authorities, public bodies and subordinate 
organizations (subsidized, budgetary organizations, etc.) and its presence 
seemed to comfort the aches of an ill, (still) corrupted public sector. 
 Diana Iancu 
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3.7. Local reforms in Slovenia 
 
Although regular, just in the case of the other CEE countries, the written 
accession dialogue between Slovenia and EU was quite synthetic: the regular 
reports were by far the less detailed in the region. However, the 
decentralization issue did appear: by 1998, progress was slow (Regular Report, 
p. 8), and remained so by 1999 (Regular Report, p. 59), the last year when 
references on local government were being made. By 2005, Slovenia’s 
Development Strategy still talked of a bureaucratic and centralized 
development model (p. 8).  
In what transparency is concerned, between 1998 and 2000, no European 
report spoke of it. In July 2000, however, Slovenia adopted a directive on 
transparency in the information society (Regular Report 2000, p. 37) which 
contributed to the European Commission’s later conclusion that an overall 
increase of transparency was ensured (Regular Report 2002, p. 21). By 2003, 
the Commission raised the issues of public accountability, and the right of 
citizens to access public information, considering that the two would contribute 
to the improvement of administrative openness, transparency and efficiency 
(Monitoring Report 2003, p. 11). More transparency and accountability from 
local governments was also advocated by the National Strategic Reference 
Framework, in 2007 (p. 23, p. 61).  
 
4. Discussing results 
 
The reports above clearly show that the tempo for reform in the two areas 
of interest, namely decentralisation and transparency in local policy-making, 
did change after accesssion. The most striking example is that of Romania, 
closely followed by Bulgaria: two countries which still fight corruption, 
although politicisation and lack of transparency make current reforms not as 
vibrant as prior accession. Stagnant reformers seem to be the Czech Republic – 
by far, the most active one, Slovakia and Slovenia. Poland and, to some extent, 
Hungary seem to maintain a certain interest in consolidating reforms, and even 
improve their past results. Such a picture is yet to be improved.  
One cannot dismiss the clear limitations this kind of research exhibits. 
EU’s monitoring offered a clear picture of the reforms that were important for 
the sake of becoming a Member. As such, there might be an informational gap 
after the accession, as not all countries offer English translations of their 
documents, nor synthetic reports of their recent successes and failures in local Local reforms by political conditionality: trials and erros in Central and Eastern Europe 
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policy-making. Incidently, only Bulgaria and Romania had their post-accession 
regularly monitored, and that might have created an assymetry in the data used 
in comparing.  
Secondly, there might be argued that in the decentralisation process one 
needs a certain framework to arrange the transfer of competencies and resources 
(major changes) and then adjustments so to better accomodate local needs and 
money with central expectations (minor changes). As the first would enjoy a 
wider visibility if one uses the strategic documents of the centre, the latter might 
only be considered consolidation trials and escape the researcher’s eye.  
Thirdly, no data on the actual implementation of the reforms the strategic 
documents talked about was taken into account; and that might have hindered 
the final results. Even so, the documentary research conducted lso far leads me 
into considering that the regress hypothesis is validated at least in the cases of 
Bulgaria and Romania. As such, further analysis of the relationship between the 
ryhthm of reform in new Member States and that exhibited before accession is 
recommended. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
(1)  See for instance: Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2003), Kelley (2004), 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), Schimmelfennig (2005), (2008), Epstein, 
Sedelmeier (2008), Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig (2010), Sedelmeier (2006), (2008), 
Epstein (2008), Pridham (2008), Sasse (2008), Sippel and Neuhoff (2009) and Trauner 
(2009). 
(2)  For CEE countries, this type of conditionality was expressed in the Copenhagen criteria 
(1993).  
(3)EU’s Regular and Monitoring Reports, Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms Reports 
(for Bulgaria and Romania), National Strategies and Strategic Reference Framework.  
(4)  Regular Report 2004, p. 16; Monitoring Report 2005, pp. 7-8; Monitoring Report May 
2006, p. 6. 
(5)  Regular Report 2002, p. 21; Regular Report 2003, pp. 15-16; Monitoring Report 2005, p. 5; 
Monitoring Report September 2006, p. 4.  
(6)  In 2007 Bulgaria adopted a Civil Procedure Code and a Judicial Systems Act, and created a 
new institution, namely the National Security Agency. By 2008 it announced a new Conflict 
of Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act (2008), and amended the Constitution and the 
Criminal Procedure Code.  
(7)  Regular Report 2000, p. 19; Regular Report 2001, p.  18; Regular Report 2002, p.  21; 
Regular Report 2003, p.  11. Diana Iancu 
 
84 
(8)  In 1998, the Czech Senate rejected a draft act on the access of citizens to information on 
grounds of being impracticable for the civil servants (Regular Report 1998, p.  10). 
(9)  Regular Report 2001, p.  16; Regular Report 2002, pp.  21-22; Monitoring Report 2003,  
p.  12.  
(10) Regular Report 1998, p.  24; Regular Report 1999, p.  28. 
(11) Regular Report 2001, pp.  31, 37, 42; Regular Report 2003, p. 15. 
(12) Transparency International Hungary provides a well-systematized portrait of the national 
progress in fighting corruption. More data is available at: http://www.transparency.hu/ (last 
access: November 2012). 
(13) Regular Report 1998, p. 9; Regular Report 1999, pp. 13-60; Regular Report 2000, p. 15; 
Regular Report 2001, p. 78; Regular Report 2002, pp. 22-23; Monitoring Report 2003, p. 14.  
(14) Regular Report 1999, p. 14; Regular Report 2001, p. 17; Regular Report 2002, p. 27; 
Monitoring Report 2003, p. 13. 
(15) The original text of the Program is available online on the webpage of the Ministry of the 
Interior and Administration (Public Administration section): http://www.mswia.gov.pl/ (last 
acess: November 2012). 
(16) Regular Report 1999, pp. 11-63; Regular Report 2000, pp. 16-20; Regular Report 2001,  
p. 17; Regular Report 2002, pp. 22, 24, 44; Regular Report 2003, p. 17; Regular Report 
2004, p. 18. 
(17) The Romanian versions of the strategies are available online on the official website of the 
Romanian Ministry of Administration and Interior: http://www.mai.gov.ro/ (last access: 
November 2012).  
(18) Regular Report 1998, p. 9; Regular Report 1999, p. 31; Regular Report 2001, pp. 22, 35; 
Regular Report 2002, p. 22.  
(19) Monitoring Reports 2005, pp. 9,12,16; and May 2006, p. 30. 
(20) Regular Report 1999, p. 14; Regular Report 2000, p. 16. 
(21) Regular Report 1998, pp. 16,18; Regular Report 1999, p. 23. 
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